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Abstract
Experimental data for two types of bargaining games are used to study the role
of strategic risk in the decision making process that takes place when subjects play
a game only once. The bargaining games are the Ultimatum Game (UG) and the
Yes-or-No Game (YNG). Strategic risk in a game stems from the eﬀect on one player’s
payoﬀ of the behavior of other players. In the UG this risk is high, while it is nearly
absent in the YNG. In studying the decision making process of subjects we use the
time elapsed before a choice is made (response time) as a proxy for amount of thought
or introspection. We find that response times are on average larger in the UG than
in the YNG, indicating a positive correlation between strategic risk and introspection.
In both games the behavior of subjects with large response times is more dispersed
than that of subjects with small response times. In the UG larger response time is
associated with less generous and thus riskier behavior, while it is associated to more
generous behavior in the YNG.
Keywords: Response Time, Ultimatum Game, Yes-or-No Game, Strategic Risk.
1 Introduction
We use Response Time (RT ) and behavioral data from two games recreated in the labora-
tory to test the hypothesis that individuals use introspection, reflecting about the strategic
risk of the situation they face, when confronted with a new strategic situation. The situa-
tions we consider are the Ultimatum Game (UG) and the Yes-or-No Game (Y NG). Both
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are two-player games, one player being the proposer, and the other the responder, and in
both games the players must agree about the division of a valuable object. The proposer
in either game makes a proposal about the division of the object that is implemented if
the responder accepts the division, while both players receive a payoﬀ of 0 if the responder
rejects. The games diﬀer in that the responder in the YNG can either accept all oﬀers or
reject all oﬀers. In the UG the responder can condition acceptance on the value of the oﬀer
made by the proposer.1 The strategy sets of proposers are identical across the two games,
while the strategy sets of responders diﬀer in a way that significantly lessens the value to
the proposer of predicting the responder’s behavior.
In our experiment we have each subject participate only once in only one game, holding
only one of the two possible roles. We do this because our questions regard one-shot
games. The study of one-shot games is important because many of the applications of
game theory in the social sciences involve situations that the relevant actors face only once
or seldom. Examples include negotiations over work contracts, the buying of property,
voting on committees under diﬀerent rules, and many decisions related to marriage and
parenting. A crucial characteristic of one-shot games is that one cannot reasonably assume
that agents know how other players will behave. Knowing how others play is fundamental
to the notion of Nash equilibrium: each agent, knowing the play of others, determines his
optimal strategy via a simple calculation. In the absence of this knowledge, any desire of
a player to behave optimally requires a guess about the way in which others will play. For
proposers in the UG such a guess is not only harder to come up with, but is also more
important for their payoﬀ than it is in the YNG. Proposers in the UG face much strategic
risk, which is risk stemming from having a partner whose decisions aﬀect their payoﬀ. In
the UG there is true risk from not knowing how the responder will behave: for each choice
of the responder, a diﬀerent payoﬀ-maximizing behavior is prescribed for the proposer; in
the YNG there is no such doubt (proposers have a weakly dominant strategy).2
This key diﬀerence between the UG and the YNG has been the target of several ex-
perimental studies (Gu¨th and Kocher [2014] provides an excellent recent survey; Gehrig
et al. [2007] and Gu¨th and Kirchkamp [2012] are experimental studies of the YNG). These
studies find that behavior in the YNG diﬀers from behavior in the UG: proposers make
smaller oﬀers and responders are less willing to reject. Such a result suggests that strate-
gic risk plays an important role in explaining the fair behavior observed in the UG. This
behavioral diﬀerence does not answer our question, which is whether agents faced with a
1We use the word ‘proposal’ to refer to a division of the 100ECU, e.g., [90, 10], giving 90 to the proposer
and 10 to the responder. The word ‘oﬀer’ is used to refer to the responder’s share that is specified by the
proposer’s proposal. In the example, the oﬀer is of 10ECU.
2In the YNG there is strategic risk since the responder may reject all oﬀers. Thus, a proposal may yield
the payoﬀ prescribed by this proposal or it may yield a payoﬀ of zero (risk). However, since this risk aﬀects
all proposals equally, it plays no role in the determination of the proposer’s optimal behavior.
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one-shot game engage in introspection. In order to tackle our question we add the mea-
surement of response time (RT ). If time elapsed before making a decision (RT ) is a good
proxy for reflection or thought invested in making that decision, then the hypothesis that
agents engage in introspection implies that the UG will generate larger RT s than the YNG.
The use of two games where the role of one of the players (the proposer) is held constant
across games in everything except the role of strategic risk - triggering the need to have
or form beliefs about the behavior of other players - is ideal for the study of our question.
Our first hypothesis, asking whether players in one shot games engage in thought about
the behavior of others thus simply boils down to testing whether RT is larger for proposers
in the UG than in the YNG. We find that this is indeed the case.
Of course, it does not suﬃce to know that such introspection occurs in order to know
how to analyze one-shot games. It is also important to understand what this introspection
is. We will not be able to answer such a question, but we will be able to say what
behaviors are prevalent with more reflection (longer RT ) for each game and across games.
Our second hypothesis postulates that both games have instinctive, focal behaviors, that
are predominant among subjects with short RT , while subjects with long RT move away
from such behaviors, producing a higher dispersion of choices. We find that focal behaviors
indeed prevail among subjects with short RT in both games, but the move away from such
behavior by subjects with longRT , goes in directions we find surprising. We find that, when
generous oﬀers by proposers are not profit enhancing and not sustainable in equilibrium
(YNG), they are more frequent among proposers with large RT . On the other hand, in the
UG large RT is associated to a higher frequency of less generous oﬀers. However, in the
UG the [50, 50] proposal that is modal among proposers with short RT , as well as the [60,
40] proposal that is modal among proposers with large RT , are both justifiable on the basis
of selfish, payoﬀ-related reasons. Our findings thus disagree with literature asserting that
more thought leads to the disappearance of (instinctive) selfless behaviors (see, e.g., Knoch
and Fehr [2007], Rand et al. [2012]). They also disagree with the finding that increased
RT amounts to additional levels of reasoning (Arad and Rubinstein [2012]) as considered
either in levels-of-reasoning models or in cognitive hierarchies models (Hauk and Nagel
[2001], Camerer et al. [2004]). The finding that proposers in the UG are generous but this
generosity is profitable given the behavior of responders, is not new (Gu¨th and Kocher
[2014]). Our finding that larger RT coincides with larger expected and realized payoﬀs of
proposers given actual behavior of responders, is akin to the finding of Avrahami et al.
[2013], with experience taking the place of RT .
We present the experimental design, with details about the theoretical properties of the
considered games, the measurement of RT , and the hypotheses we test, in section 2. Our
results are presented in section 3. We discuss the findings and the setup and we conclude
in section 4.
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2 Experimental Design
We report data from an experiment run with 378 subjects across 12 experimental sessions.
All subjects were undergraduate students (from diﬀerent disciplines) at Jena University,
had no training in Game Theory and had no previous experience with bargaining experi-
ments in the lab. Students were recruited using ORSEE 2.0 (Greiner [2004]). The experi-
ment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [2007]) at the
computer laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena, Germany). Subjects
received written instructions, which were also read aloud by a research assistant to ensure
everyone understood them (full experimental instructions can be found in supplementary
online material). No communication between subjects was permitted. Interaction between
participants was anonymous but in sessions covering 2/3 of the analyzed data subjects
were informed of the gender of their partner and in all analyzed sessions subjects knew
whether their partner was from Jena or not from Jena. At the end of every experimental
session, subjects were paid in cash according to their payoﬀ in the game (plus a show-up
fee of e2.5). Every session lasted about 30 minutes and the average earnings per subject
were e7.5.
2.1 The Games
Approximately half of the subjects (192 subjects) participated in an Ultimatum Game
experiment (UG) while the remaining 186 subjects participated in a Yes-or-No Game ex-
periment (YNG). Subjects made their payoﬀ-relevant choice only once. In both games
each subject’s payoﬀ depended on his own choice as well as that of an anonymous and
randomly-assigned partner. The two subjects involved in each game had diﬀerent roles.
The proposer proposed one out of nine possible divisions of 100 Experimental Currency
Units (ECU, with an exchange rate of 10 ECU/e), while the responder decided on condi-
tional acceptance or rejection of each possible proposal.3 The two games diﬀered only in
the choices available to the responder. In the UG the responder had to choose whether to
accept or reject each possible oﬀer of the proposer one by one. In this way the responder
was allowed to condition his acceptance of the proposer’s oﬀer on the exact value of this
oﬀer. Responders made their choices in cold, before knowing the actual oﬀer of their part-
ner.4 If the responder made his accept/reject choices such that he rejected all oﬀers where
he received less than a certain share, and accepted all oﬀers where he received that share
or more, we called this share the Minimal Acceptable Oﬀer (MAO).
In the YNG, the responder was asked to choose whether he would accept every oﬀer
3We used neutral names, X (proposer) and Y (responder), for the two roles.
4This way of implementing the classical sequential UG is called the strategy method (Selten [1967])
because it implements the strategic representation of the game.
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or reject every oﬀer from the proposer. Also in this case responders made their choices in
cold, without knowing the proposal of their partner.
Subjects’ payoﬀs in both games depended on the choices of both partners: they got
paid only if the oﬀer was deemed acceptable by the responder’s choice, in which case they
each received a share as established by the proposer’s proposal. We will use bracketed
pairs to denote the available proposals: [90, 10], [80, 20], and so on. The first number in
each pair denotes the share going to the proposer and the second number, the share going
to the responder.
2.2 Response Times
For each subject and matched pair of subjects we record strategy choices, payoﬀs, and
response time (RT ). We define response time to be the time elapsed between the moment
in which a subject is presented with the problem and the moment when a choice is made.
Subjects were not pressed to make a fast choice but they were allowed to leave the lab
only after all subjects made a choice.5 We will compare subjects’ response times across
games. Since response times depend on all elements of a decision, including complexity of
the interface that presents the problem and physical motions needed to express a choice,
it is important that the presentation of the problem be as similar as possible across the
two games we compare. We make a big eﬀort for this to be the case for the proposers in
our experiment. For the responders, not having the same strategy set across games, the
interface for decision is less comparable. We hence will give only marginal attention to RT
comparisons across games for responders.
2.3 Experimental Hypotheses and Games
We will focus our analysis on two hypotheses, which we test via RT values and their in-
teraction with proposer choices in both games.
H(1): Introspection. Proposers in the UG have longer response times than proposers
in the YNG.
The above stems from the hypothesis that players in one-shot games engage in introspec-
tion. With this we mean that in one-shot games, players, recognizing that the behavior
of other players aﬀects their own payoﬀ, will dedicate thought to forming beliefs about
such behavior. To deduce hypothesis H(1) from the previous statement, one must assume
5The measurement of response times (RT ) has been used in psychology to study mental structures since
the mid 19th century. It is the time elapsed between a visual or auditory stimulus and the response, choice,
or decision that the stimulus calls for (see, e.g., Luce [1991], Jensen [2006]). Experiments in psychology
are typically simple in the number and type of choices they ask subjects to make and measurement is very
precise (up to the millisecond). Our use of RT is very diﬀerent. Since measurement is less precise, we limit
our use of RT to comparisons across situations.
5
that more thought, on average, implies longer RT . One must also notice that proposers
across the two games have identical strategy sets and choice interfaces. Hence, any diﬀer-
ence across games in the amount of thought dedicated by proposers to choice can only be
interpreted as thought dedicated to responders’ choices.
There are two ways in which the choices available to responders in the UG are worthy
of more thought by proposers in that game than in the YNG. First, the sheer numbers:
in the YNG responders have only two possible strategies while in the UG they have nine
monotonic strategies.6 Second, strategic risk : in the YNG the proposer has a weakly
dominant strategy, which means there is one option that delivers a (weakly) better material
outcome regardless of the choice of the responder. In the YNG strategic risk is low for the
proposer since the choice of the responder does not aﬀect the proposer’s understanding of
which of his/her available strategies is individually optimal.
In the UG strategic risk for the proposer is high since, to start with, proposers in the
UG have no dominant strategy: for each monotonic strategy of the responder a diﬀerent
strategy of the proposer becomes optimal. But even more, the UG is a game with many
equilibria and each of the nine monotonic strategies available to responders can be sustained
as part of a Nash equilibrium of the game. Summarizing, in the UG responders’ choices
aﬀect what choice is optimal for proposers (no dominant strategy for proposer) and it is
hard to predict what choice a responder will ultimately make (all responder’s MAOs are
sustainable in Nash equilibrium).
Our second hypothesis is concerned with within game diﬀerences in behavior due to
diﬀerences in RT . This relates to much of the work in RT (see Rubinstein [2007], Piovesan
and Wengstrom [2009], and Rand et al. [2012], for a few important examples). Prior work
leads us to speculate that pro-social behavior will be most immediate in situations where
this behavior is sustainable in equilibrium, like in the UG. In the YNG, where there is a
unique Nash equilibrium, we expect this equilibrium to be focal behavior and, hence, most
immediate.
H(2): Within-Game Behavior and RT . In both games subjects with small RT have
more concentrated behavior than subjects with large RT .
In particular, in the UG, behavior of proposers with small RT is modal around the egali-
tarian proposal [50, 50], while in the YNG, behavior of proposers with small RT is modal
around the selfish proposal [90, 10] (unique equilibrium).
The reason to consider [50, 50] a focal equilibrium is evidence from experiments with
the UG where this proposal is found to be modal. Moreover, proposers who believe that
responders will reject unfair oﬀers, will find that an oﬀer of 50 is a safe bet, minimizing
6The total number of strategies available to responders in the UG is 29. Strategies for which a MAO
exists – monotonic strategies – are only nine: one for each possible proposal by the proposer. It is reasonable
and empirically justified to believe that responders will mainly use such monotonic strategies.
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Subject Group
Female Eq. gender From Jena Eq. origin All
Mean oﬀer
UG 42.3 (39.6) 40.6 (42.0) 40.0 (41.0) 41.5 (38.3) 40.9
YNG 22.2 (26.4) 26.4 (23.0) 21.4 (24.6) 25.6 (21.1) 24.3
Mean MAO UG 22.8 (22.9) 22.2 (22.5) 26.7 (22.3) 23.3 (21.0) 22.8
Mean RT proposers
UG 32.7 (29.1) 29.5 (31.4) 29.7 (31.0) 29.1 (37.5) 30.8
YNG 24.6 (26.2) 24.5 (22.4) 38.4 (24.3) 23.8 (29.4) 25.4
Mean RT responders
UG 38.5 (41.9) 41.2 (39.0) 45.1 (39.5) 40.6 (38.7) 40.2
YNG 15.8 (14.6) 14.7 (14.6) 15.0 (15.3) 15.0 (15.8) 15.2
Table 1: Summary statistics of behavior and RT given the known demographic data of
participants. Alternative in parenthesis: Female (Male), Eq. gender (Not eq. gender),
From Jena (Not from Jena), Eq. origin (Not eq. origin).
strategic risk while maintaining a reasonable payoﬀ for the proposer.
There are several reasons why subjects with larger RT are expected to display less
concentrated behavior, and we will only be able to somewhat uncover these reasons. We
name a few. First, subjects who understand what is selfishly optimal may nonetheless feel
morally attracted to make diﬀerent oﬀers. This moral dilemma may be a cause of delay
and the final resolution of the dilemma may be a generous oﬀer or not. Second, subjects
who do not understand well the game may be slower and their behavior is likely to be
noisy. Finally, subjects who understand the trade oﬀ between payoﬀ and strategic risk
may try to outguess the behavior of responders or simply gather the courage to make a
proposal diﬀerent from the egalitarian proposal in the UG. Here we will provide evidence
of dispersion in behavior for large RT , and we will give suggestive evidence for the first
and last of the spelled out reasons.
3 Results
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for our data divided by gender and origin. In all
our sessions subjects were told whether their partner was from Jena or not and in 2/3 of
all considered data subjects were told the gender of their partner. Approximately 50% of
proposers and responders in both games were female and, hence, approximately 50% of all
matches were among subjects of equal gender (in those sessions where subjects were told
the gender of their partner). 12% of both proposers and responders were from Jena in the
UG, 8% of proposers and 23% of responders were from Jena in the YNG. Approximately
75% of all matches were among subjects who were both from Jena or both not from Jena.
As is suggested by the data in table 1, gender, origin, and homogeneity of the match had
no qualitative eﬀect on RT and behavior. Wherever relevant we further substantiate this
claim with the appropriate statistical analyses.
7
RT Quartile
(Fast) −→ (Slow)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
KL distance from uniform
UG 0.56 0.42 0.40 0.31
YNG 0.62 0.43 0.24 0.04
Pearson’s χ2 – H0 : Uniform
UG 26.8∗∗ 16.8∗∗ 13.4∗∗ 13.3∗
YNG 31.6∗∗ 18.4∗∗ 11.6∗ 2.0
Table 2: Upper panel: Kullback-Leibler measure of divergence from a uniform distribution
over all oﬀers. High values indicate concentration, low values indicate dispersion. Lower
panel: Pearson’s χ2 test of equality to a uniform distribution over all oﬀers. (∗∗) Diﬀerence
from a uniform distribution significant at the 1% level. (∗) Diﬀerence from a uniform
distribution significant at the 5% level.
We cannot reject hypothesis H(1). Overall RT s are larger in the UG than in the
YNG for both proposers and responders. The mean proposer RT in the UG is 30.8 sec-
onds, while it is 25.4 seconds in the YNG, significantly smaller than the UG (the t-test of
equal means against the alternative hypothesis that the YNG has smaller RT , has p-value
0.0415). Moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of first order stochastic dominance of the
distribution of RT for the UG over that for the YNG has a p-value of 0.015. This first
order stochastic dominance is graphically displayed in figure 1a. If we restrict attention to
proposal [50, 50], which is focal in the UG but not in the YNG, we still find that YNG
response times are shorter, albeit not significantly so (mean of 20.24 seconds in the YNG
and 26.27 in the UG, one-sided p-value for diﬀerence of means equal to 0.12). To control
for gender, origin, and matching eﬀects (by gender and origin), we ran regressions of RT
on a game dummy variable (simple t-test), but included controls capturing gender, origin,
and particular matching among participants, like male-with-male, etc. (t-test with con-
trols). The diﬀerence in RT between games remains significant (one-sided t-test p-value
less than 0.04 in all regressions, just like in the t-test without controls – see section 5 in
the supplementary online material for regression reports).
We now turn to hypothesis H(2), which states that in both games there are focal
proposals made by proposers with small response times, while proposers with large response
times make a bigger variety of proposals. We therefore now focus on behavior (proposals)
of proposers in our two considered games. In the UG, overall, the modal proposal is
[50, 50], while it is [90, 10] in the YNG. The distributions of proposals across games are
statistically diﬀerent (Pearson’s χ2 test with p-value less than 0.001). There is a negative
rank correlation between the popularity of a proposal and the RT of subjects making such
a proposal (ρ = −0.179, significant at the 10% level): frequent choices are also the choices
made by proposers with small response times, which supports the existence of instinctive
choices. The instinctive choice for the UG is to propose [50, 50], while for the YNG it is
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(a) Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of RT for
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(b) UG: Joint histogram of RT and Oﬀer.
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(c) YNG: Joint histogram of RT and Oﬀer.
Figure 1: Distributional data of RT and Oﬀer for proposers in both games. RT in the UG
first-order stochastically dominates RT in the YNG (figure 1a). Figures 1b and 1c show
how oﬀers diﬀer across games and depending on proposer’s RT .
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Oﬀers RT
Mean Median Mode Mean Coeﬀ. of variation
UG Proposers
Q1 43.0 50 50 14.1 0.19
Q4 39.1 40 40 61.6 0.43
YNG Proposers
Q1 21.7 10 10 10.9 0.15
Q4 27.0 30 10 50.3 0.40
UG Responders
Q1 16.3 10 10 23.2 0.15
Q4 30.4 30 40 67.3 0.28
Table 3: Comparison of oﬀers to the responders and RT between RT quartiles Q1 and Q4.
to propose [90, 10]. We find a significant percentage (approx. 52%) of oﬀers larger than 10
in the YNG. In the extant literature this percentage is often even larger and is attributed
to simple inequality aversion (Gehrig et al. [2007]). Slower choices are less concentrated,
as we show in table 2.7
Figures 1b and 1c show the joint histogram of behavior (proposer oﬀers) andRT , hinting
at the fact that there are significant behavioral diﬀerences between diﬀerently fast proposers
in each of the considered games and that non-focal proposals are the most frequent among
proposers with large RT . Table 2 shows data divided into four speed quartiles (quartile 1,
Q1, contains the proposers with smallest RT , and quartile 4, Q4, contains the proposers
with largest RT ), and table 3 shows data for the first and last of these quartiles.8 Table
2 contains two indicators of the dispersion of choice. Clearly, dispersion increases with
higher quartiles in both considered games.
We already saw that in both games there are instinctive choices that prevail among
proposers with small values of RT , and that these choices are diﬀerent across games. In
what remains we analyze what are the choices made by proposers with large values of RT .
Table 3 compares behavior and payoﬀs of subjects in Q1 and Q4. In the YNG, the
distribution of proposals in Q4 is not distinguishable from a uniform (uniform distribution
over the 5 proposals giving the proposer 50 or more). Median proposals are [90, 10] in
Q1 and Q2, [80, 20] in Q3, and [70, 30] in Q4. There is a strong correlation between RT
and pro-social proposals that are neither equilibrium nor individually rational in terms of
7Proposals across games are statistically diﬀerent after controlling for gender, origin, matching on gender
and origin, and cross eﬀects of these control variables. Given the nature of the dependent variable oﬀer,
we ran interval regressions of oﬀer as a function of a game dummy variable and the control variables. The
t statistic for game eﬀect has a p-value less than 0.001 regardless of the controls considered and controls
are never significant. An interval regression is a maximum likelihood estimation where the likelihood of
each data point is the density evaluated on an interval instead of at a point. Full regression reports in the
supplementary online material.
8The categorization is approximate whenever 25% of the considered subset of the data is not an integer.
An alternative categorization, used both in Rubinstein [2008] and Piovesan and Wengstrom [2009], is to
split the data into four unequally-sized groups: the Very Fast 10% with smallest values of RT , the Very
Slow 10% with largest values of RT and two groups containing 40% of the data each, of Fast and Slow
subjects. Our qualitative results are maintained with this alternative categorization.
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payoﬀ. We cannot disentangle whether the high frequency of oﬀ-equilibrium, pro-social
proposals among proposers with high RT in the YNG is due to a correlation between RT
and mis-understanding of the game or due to time required to solve a (moral) dilemma
among pro-social proposers. The fact that no equivalent statistical equality to the uniform
distribution arises in the UG, which is a more complex game, plays in favor of the latter
interpretation.
In the UG, the distribution of proposals in Q4 has full support and the modal proposal
is significantly less accentuated than in Q1.9 The median proposal is [50, 50] in Q1 and
[60, 40] in all other quartiles, while the mode is [50, 50] in Q1 and is [60, 40] in Q4. The
latter is particularly important in view of the behavior of responders in the UG.
Given the empirical distribution of MAO, proposal [60, 40] has the largest expected
payoﬀ (ECU 58.75) and a lower variance than all lower proposals (it has larger variance than
proposal [50, 50], which yields a sure payoﬀ of 50 in our sample). Given the distribution
of MAO that we observe, we find that on average, proposers in Q4 made choices with the
highest expected payoﬀ (table 3). In the UG, unlike in the YNG, larger RT correlates
with more individually rational (in terms of payoﬀs) behavior. Choices of proposers with
large RT are strategically riskier but yield a higher payoﬀ in expectation, given responders’
behavior.
Until this point we had disregarded responder data (except for the calculation of pro-
posal expected payoﬀ in the previous paragraph), because of the diﬃculty of comparing
responder RT data across games.10 On the other hand, the comparison of responder be-
havior (MAO) across RT quartiles is not only possible but also very useful. There are
significant behavioral diﬀerences across quartiles,11 with a positive correlation between RT
and MAO. Like the proposers in the UG, the responders with large RT are more prone to
make risky choices, but unlike these proposers, such choices are not in and of themselves
payoﬀ enhancing. Like the proposers in the YNG, responders with large RT in the UG are
likely to have social motivations: a preference for fairness, spite, or the social responsibility
to enforce a responder-favorable equilibrium.
9If the RT categories of Rubinstein [2007] and Piovesan and Wengstrom [2009] are used, the behavioral
diﬀerence between the Very Fast and the Very Slow is more accentuated than that between our Q1 and
Q4. While the Very Slow proposers make every possible proposal, the Very Fast make only proposals [50,
50] and [60, 40].
10All the comparisons of responder RT across games go in the expected direction. Responder RT in the
UG is larger on average and more dispersed than responder RT in the YNG. Responders in the UG also
have larger response times, on average, than proposers.
11Pearson’s χ2 test with p-value= 0.018, regressions with or without control variables yield coeﬃcients
Q3 and Q4 dummies that are significant at 1%, while Q2 is never significantly diﬀerent from Q1 (omitted,
base).
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4 Discussion
In our work we find that, on average, proposers have larger RT in the game that is strategi-
cally more complex (UG), even though the strategy space and interface of the two consid-
ered games are identical. Across games (UG and YNG) and roles (proposer and responder),
larger RT is associated with behaviors where there is a risk or a certainty of loosing money
with respect to the instinctive choice (choice made by the majority of subjects, and most
so by subjects with a small RT ). However, the motivation behind choosing to bear such a
(potential) loss of money diﬀers significantly across games and roles. For proposers in the
UG, it leads to larger payoﬀs in expectation, due to a better reply to responder behavior;
for proposers in the YNG, it leads to a sure loss of money from generous, pro-social be-
havior. For responders in the UG, it indirectly leads to larger payoﬀs: it is the behavior of
responders with large RT that sustains proposers’ generous behavior, by inducing a risk
of rejection for low oﬀers.
Since our paper is concerned with behavior in one-shot games, it is obvious to ask how
our data relate to models of levels of reasoning and cognitive hierarchies (Nagel [1995], and
Camerer et al. [2004], respectively). We do not find that behavior of subjects with larger
values of RT corresponds to higher levels of reasoning.12 Arad and Rubinstein [2012] find
the opposite. This is likely due to a few important diﬀerences between our work and theirs:
the games we consider are more social and simpler than the Colonel Blotto game analyzed
in Arad and Rubinstein [2012], and the levels of reasoning model used in their work is
modified to include a stage where the problem is broken down in separate dimensions.
Arad and Rubinstein [2012] make an eﬀort to strip oﬀ of social content the situation
faced by their experimental subjects. Our work and findings are closer to works dealing
with the cross eﬀects of reflection (RT in our case) and social concerns on behavior (e.g.,
Knoch and Fehr [2007], Piovesan and Wengstrom [2009], Rand et al. [2012], Fischbacher
et al. [2013]). Unlike in Rand et al. [2012], we do not find that reflection leads to a depletion
of intuitive cooperative attitudes. On the contrary, in our experiment pro-social behavior
with negative payoﬀ eﬀects appear only among proposers in the YNG and responders in
the UG that have large response times. Rand et al. [2012] remark, however, that the eﬀect
of reflection on cooperative attitudes is modulated by their subjects’ experience in life and
with experiments: instinctive cooperation in their setting may be driven by subjects who
associate the game in the experiment with games they play in life where they and their
12When the UG is analyzed with a levels of reasoning model, whenever a proposer of level j proposes [50,
50], a responder of level j + 1 is indiﬀerent between all values of MAO between 10 and 50. If we assume
that a responder who is indiﬀerent randomizes uniformly over all strategies, we get oscillation: proposers
of odd level propose [50, 50], proposers of even level propose [90, 10]; responders of odd level set a MAO
of 10, responders of even level randomize equally over all values of MAO. A cognitive hierarchies model,
where players of level j best respond to a population containing players with all levels lower than j, predicts
convergence to proposal [90, 10] by proposers of high level, and to aMAO of 10 by responders of high level.
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co-players cooperate. Among subjects who are experienced with cooperation experiments,
they find that RT may actually be enhancing of cooperation (this finding is not significant).
In a study using temporary impairment of brain functions via magnetic stimulation, Knoch
and Fehr [2007] find that UG responders impaired in areas associated to self control are less
likely to reject low oﬀers. This relates to our finding that small response times associate
to small values of MAO. Rejecting unfair oﬀers requires more self control (Knoch and
Fehr [2007]) or longer RT (our study). In a very innovative study, Fischbacher et al. [2013]
address procedural heterogeneity among subjects. They find that diﬀerent types of subjects
(as identified from behavior in several ultimatum games) display diﬀerent behavioral eﬀects
of RT . Our work suggests that a similar heterogeneity may arise across games.
Finally, Piovesan and Wengstrom [2009] study dictator games, where strategic consid-
erations are completely removed while maintaining the social nature of the situation. Just
like in our YNG, they find that larger RT is associated with more pro-social behavior.
Their across-games analysis shows that RT is larger if the moral dilemma faced by dicta-
tors is more complex (there is no clear fair option). A comparison of RT between the UG,
the YNG, and the dictator game may be illuminating. In the dictator game there is no
strategic risk for the proposer since the proposer’s payoﬀ depends on his/her choice only.
Behaviorally, on average, oﬀers in the dictator game are lowest, followed by YNG oﬀers
and finally UG oﬀers (Gu¨th and Kocher [2014]). One may expect a similar ranking of the
games in terms of proposer RT . However, the dictator game also poses a very diﬀerent
social and moral dilemma than the UG and YNG, since the proposer (dictator) bears full
responsibility for the payoﬀ of the responder. When we take into account the correlation
we find between pro-social behavior and RT in the YNG, and the changed social role of
the proposer in the dictator game, the expectation of RT for the dictator game becomes
less clear. Therefore, adding this third game for comparison may deliver surprising and
informative results.
Since we are concerned with one-shot games, we analyze data on one-shot experimental
games. However, there is much to be learned from the evolution of the relation between
RT and behavior when experience is accumulated. Only Piovesan and Wengstrom [2009]
brush over the analysis of such data. Whatever introspection is used by subjects to choose
behavior in novel strategic situations should become less relevant as they accumulate expe-
rience. Hence, it is of interest to understand what behavioral eﬀects of RT disappear with
experience. In our case, will RT still correlate with pro-social behavior? Will it correlate
with the taking of (strategic) risks? We leave such questions to future work.
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1 Experimental Instructions
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please read the
instructions carefully. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. It is
strictly forbidden to communicate with other participants during the experiment. It is very
important that you follow this rule. Otherwise we must exclude you from the experiment
and from all payments. Should you have any question, please raise your hand and we will
answer it individually.
During the experiment, we use ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) instead of euro. At
the end of the experiment, the ECU you have earned, will be converted to euro (10 ECU
= 1e) and the obtained amount will be paid to you in cash.
In this experiment, two participants will interact with each other just once. Each of the
two members of a pair will be randomly assigned one of two roles: X or Y. In the top right
corner of the computer screen, you can read which role (either X or Y) has been assigned
to you and to your partner.
Each pair can share 100 ECU. X has the right to propose the distribution of the 100
ECU. In particular, X chooses the distribution (x, y) meaning that X wants to keep x
ECU for him/herself, and to give y ECU to Y. More specifically, X can choose any of the
following 9 distributions:
x 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
y 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
∗Middlesex University Business School, Hendon Campus, The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, UK
†ESC-Rennes School of Business Corresponding author. debrah.meloso@esc-rennes.com
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Ultimatum Game Only
Y must decide for each possible distribution of the 100 ECU, if he or she accepts or rejects
it. Thus, Y will face the following table:
x 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
y 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Accept
Reject
For each possible distribution, Y must specify if he or she accepts or rejects it by checking
the corresponding box (thus Y is required to make 9 decisions). After X and Y have made
their choices, their payoﬀs are determined as follows:
• If Y has accepted the actual proposal by X, then both get what X has proposed, i.e.,
X earns x and Y earns y.
• If Y has rejected the actual proposal, then both earn nothing, i.e., the 100 ECU are
lost.
Yes-or-No Game Only
Without knowing which of the 9 possible proposals X has chosen, Y must accept or
reject it.
After X and Y have made their choices, their payoﬀs are determined as follows:
• If Y has accepted, then both get what X has proposed, i.e., X earns x and Y earns y.
• If Y has rejected, then both earn nothing i.e., the 100 ECU are lost. It must be
emphasized that Y does not know the actual distribution (x, y) proposed by X when
deciding whether to accept or reject it.
At the end of the experiment, the actual payoﬀ will be paid out in cash, together with
the show-up fee of e2.50 for having shown up on time.
2 Game Presentations
Figures 1 to 3 display the way in which the game was presented to subjects in our ex-
periment. Notice that the screen for proposers in the UG and the YNG was exactly the
same.
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Figure 1: Screen where proposers in either the UG or the YNG were presented their
available options and made their choice.
3
Figure 2: Screen where responders in the UG were presented their available options and
made their choice.
4
Figure 3: Screen where responders in the YNG were presented their available options and
made their choice.
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3 Further Details of Collected Data
In the YNG we had a total of 186 participants, 94 in the role of responders and 92 in the
role of proposers. The mismatch is due to an inconsequential technical issue that matched
two responders to the same proposer in two separate occasions. Subjects involved in this
situation were not aware of it and both responders in both occasions ”accepted every oﬀer”,
meaning that the decision for the payoﬀ of their proposer was unambiguous. Not all YNG
data were used: there were two proposers who made oﬀers larger than 50, we excluded
them from all data analysis.
In the UG we had a total of 192 participants, 96 in each role. Not all data were used.
We have five proposers who make oﬀers larger than 50, we exclude them from all statistical
analysis. We also have four responders who do not have a minimal acceptable oﬀer (MAO)
since they submitted non-monotonic strategies. The four instances are: Subject 321, who
rejects oﬀers where he receives 90, 10, or 20. Subject 414 accepts the oﬀer where he receives
10 and rejects all other oﬀers. Subject 513 rejects oﬀers where he receives more than 60.
Finally, subject 1308 only accepts oﬀers where he receives either 40, 50, or 60.
Tests repeated using all proposer data, without excluding oﬀers larger than 50, for both
the UG and the YNG, led to minor quantitative changes with no qualitative consequences.
4 Gender and Origin Eﬀect on Proposals
In table 1 we report interval regressions of proposer oﬀers on a game dummy and the
controls of gender, gender match, origin (either from Jena or from elsewhere), origin match
and cross eﬀects. Gender is measured with a dummy variable taking value 1 if the proposer
was female (variable female). Gender match is measured with a dummy variable taking
value 1 if the proposer was matched with a responder of the same gender (variable gmatch).
Origin is measured with a dummy variable taking value 1 if the proposer was not from
Jena (variable foreign). Origin match is measured with a dummy variable taking value 1
if the proposer was matched with a responder of the same origin; i.e., both proposer and
responder were from Jena or both proposer and responder were not from Jena (variable
omatch). Finally, cross eﬀects of both gender match and origin match were measured with
a dummy variable called gomatch.
Interval regressions are maximum likelihood estimations where data points are matched
to an entire interval and its probability instead of to a single point. Being maximum likeli-
hood estimations, we do not give goodness of fit for each model using R2, but using instead
the χ2 estimator for the likelihood ratio between the estimated model and a model with
only a constant. In the models reported in table 1, the likelihood ratio test is significant,
meaning that the models are useful beyond computing a simple mean. This is not the case
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Models
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
game
−16.523∗∗∗ −16.085∗∗∗ −16.019∗∗∗
(1.996) (2.019) (2.020)
female
−0.718 −0.363
(1.997) (2.017)
gmatch
1.430 −0.360
(2.102) (4.249)
foreign
−1.128 −1.228
(3.731) (3.761)
omatch
4.296 3.475
(2.670) (3.152)
gomatch
2.373
(4.885)
Constant
40.727∗∗∗ 38.408∗∗∗ 38.77∗∗∗
(1.84) (3.194) (3.720)
Observations 181 181 181
Likelihood ratio χ2 58.67∗∗∗ 60.96∗∗∗ 61.72∗∗∗
Table 1: Interval regressions of proposal as a function of game type (UG or YNG, UG used
as base), and several control variables. (∗∗∗) p < 0.01, (∗∗) p < 0.05, (∗) p < 0.1.
if we drop the game dummy from regressions.
In table 2 we report interval regressions of proposal on the control variables only,
with the data separated by games. If we do not separate by games (not reported here)
the variance of the coeﬃcients of the control variables is even larger and the qualitative
result of no explanatory power holds through. As can be seen in table 2, none of the
control variables has a significant eﬀect on the value of proposals, and the models have
no meaningful explanatory power beyond the computation of a simple mean of proposals
(likelihood ratio test is never significant, not even at the 0.1 level). This is true for both
the UG and the YNG.
5 Gender and Origin Eﬀect on Response Tiimes
Table 3 contains t-tests of the diﬀerence in mean RT of proposers across games, without
controls, as well as with diﬀerent controls of gender and origin of subjects (female, gmatch,
foreign, omatch, and gomatch as defined in section 4). The p-values for the treatment
eﬀect (variable Y NG) are given for a one-sided test of the diﬀerence in means – the
alternative hypothesis being that RT is larger in the UG than in the YNG.
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UG YNG
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
female
2.760 2.906 −4.150 −3.591
(2.243) (2.245) (3.266) (3.346)
gmatch
−0.407 −3.521 3.128 1.922
(2.362) (5.559) (3.437) (6.227)
foreign
−2.156 −1.573 0.454 −1.076
(4.225) (4.219) (6.581) (6.606)
omatch
4.305 3.321 4.372 3.536
(3.586) (3.955) (3.889) (4.738)
gomatch
3.502 2.101
(6.127) (7.477)
Constant
39.70∗∗∗ 39.282∗∗∗ 38.392∗∗∗ 25.333∗∗∗ 20.807∗∗∗ 23.456∗∗∗
(1.730) (3.143) (3.720) (2.613) (5.912) (6.783)
Observations 91 91 91 90 90 90
Likelihood ratio χ2 1.52 1.52 3.54 2.46 1.51 3.83
Table 2: Interval regressions of proposal as a function of several control variables. Data
separated by game. (∗∗∗) p < 0.01, (∗∗) p < 0.05, (∗) p < 0.1.
6 Response Time and Behavior Figures
Figure 4a clearly indicates that the most frequent oﬀer in the UG is [50, 50], and figure
5a indicates that this is overwhelmingly the modal oﬀer among the Very Fast proposers.
Figures 5a and 5b show histograms of proposer behavior (oﬀers) divided into four categories
according to RT . Each category contains approximately 25% of the data (slightly more
or slightly less when the total data are not divisible by four). The Very Fast category
contains behavior for the 25% of proposers that have the smallest RT , with growing RT
up to category Very Slow.
Proposer behavior in the YNG diﬀers significantly from that in the UG, both overall
and by speed category. The modal oﬀer is [90, 10], and this is particularly accentuated
among the fastest proposers (see figures 4b and 5b).
Figure 6 contains information on RT and the joint histograms of RT and behavior
(MAO) for responders in the UG. Figure 7a shows histograms of MAO across all RT
categories. The table shows the expected payoﬀ of each oﬀer the proposers can make,
that is implied by the distribution of responder behavior. That is, given the MAO set
by responders in our dataset, each oﬀer of the proposers in the UG may be rejected or
not. Given these rejection rates and the payoﬀ that each proposal gives to the proposer
him/herself, the proposals will have diﬀerent expected payoﬀs that are summarized in the
table in figure 7b (Gx denotes probability of acceptance of oﬀer x).
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(a) Proposer oﬀers in the UG. (b) Proposer oﬀers in the YNG.
Figure 4: Histograms of oﬀers [100− x, 100], where x ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}.
(a) Histograms of oﬀers in each RT category for proposers in the UG.
(b) Histograms of oﬀers in each RT category for proposers in the YNG.
Figure 5: Four categories according to proposer RT : There are 9 subjects in Very Fast
and in Very Slow, 36 subjects in Slow, and 36 in Fast in the YNG, and 37 in the UG.
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(b) Joint histogram of responder MAO and RT in
the UG
(c) Histogram of MAO for responders in diﬀerent RT categories.
Figure 6: Data on choices and RT for responders.
(a) Histogram of responder MAOs.
Proposer’s oﬀer of [100 − x, x]
x→ 10 20 30 40 50
Gx 0.4688 0.5104 0.7604 0.9792 1
Px 42.19 40.83 53.23 58.75 50
SEx 44.91 39.99 29.88 8.57 0
(b) Distribution of payoﬀs for each oﬀer, given the distri-
bution of MAOs. Px : expectation, and SEx : std. error of
payoﬀ, for oﬀer x.
Figure 7: Responder behavior in the UG induces a binomial distribution of payoﬀs for each
strategy chosen by proposers in the UG.
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Y NG -5.391** -5.414** -6.024** -5.859**
(3.091) (3.106) (3.135) (3.155)
female 1.079 0.657
(3.107) (3.151)
gmatch -1.654 -7.913
(3.271) (6.637)
foreign 0.136 0.521
(5.790) (5.874)
omatch -6.877** -9.717**
(4.144) (4.923)
gomatch 8.270
(7.632)
Constant 30.802*** 30.855*** 36.200*** 38.166***
(2.179) (2.864) (4.957) (5.811)
Observations 181 181 181 181
Table 3: Linear regressions of RT as a function of the game and several control variables.
(∗∗∗) p < 0.01, (∗∗) p < 0.05, (∗) p < 0.1.
7 Pseudo-UG
The variety of choices in the YNG suggests the presence of pro-social types who play
certain strategies regardless of their profitability. There may be correlation between RT
and behavioral type in both the YNG and the UG. There are good reasons for wishing
to eliminate such correlation from our data. For example, the hypothesis that larger RT
corresponds to a higher level in a cognitive hierarchies model, may be falsely rejected only
because behavioral types with a tendency to make proposal [50, 50], also tend to have a
larger RT . Let us assume that the percentages of pro-social behavior observed in the YNG
are representative of the percentages of pro-social “types” that are also present in the UG.
To explain this better, suppose 35% of all proposals in the UG are [50, 50], while only 5%
of proposals in the YNG are [50, 50]. According to our assumption, approx. 14% of the
35% of egalitarian proposals in the UG (5% of all proposals) are made by egalitarian types
who would have made such a proposal under any circumstance. We wish to remove these
proposals. Since we do not know which proposals among all [50, 50] proposals are made by
egalitarian types, our procedure will randomly remove an appropriate percentage from the
UG sample repeatedly, to simulate a data set that is behavioral-type free. Let fi be the
frequency of oﬀer i ∈ {[70, 30], [60, 40], [50, 50]} in the YNG. To generate the pseudo-UG
data we randomly choose a fraction fi of proposers in the UG who make oﬀer i to be
removed from the sample. We repeat this random process 100 times and obtain a sample
with proposer oﬀers and response times, which we call the Pseudo-UG sample.
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The Pseudo-UG sample has mean oﬀers that diﬀer significantly (at the 5% level) be-
tween all pairs of speed categories (mean oﬀer equals 38.09 for the slowest 25% proposers
and 43.4 for the fastest 25%). Kullback-Leibler divergence is decreasing with RT . The
histogram of oﬀers is unimodal with mode at 50 for all speed categories except the slowest,
which has two modes: one at 40 and one at 50. The pseudo-UG data maintains most
qualitative features of the original UG data, with two diﬀerences: the relative frequency
of proposal [90, 10] is higher overall in the pseudo-UG data and the slowest group has two
modes instead of the unique mode at [60, 40] that we obtained with the original data. The
hypothesis that fast behavior is more concentrated than slow behavior cannot be rejected
with pseudo-UG data either. Also, the hypothesis that RT positively correlates with levels
of reasoning is rejected with the pseudo-UG data as well as with the original data.
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